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Multiple-Layer Candidate Sieves Against Serial Cryptographic Implementations

15 pagesPublished: October 3, 2022

Abstract

The existing multiple-layer candidate sieve exploits collisions to filter the candidates to achieve a much smaller space for easier key recovery, and tries to recover the key ranking at very deep candidate space. However, it leads to enormous computation yet achieves very low success probability. In this paper, we build a novel Simple Multiple-Layer Sieve (SMLS) from Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) and achieve better performance than the existing one. Furthermore, we build two combined sieves named Two-Layer Stacking Sieve (TLSS) and Full-Layer Stacking Sieve (FLSS) since same operations in serial cryptographic implementation generate similar leakage. The experimental results verify their superiority.

Keyphrases: FLSS, multiple-layer sieve, serial implementation, Side Channel Attack, SMLS, stacking attack, TLSs

In: Ulrich Kühne and Fan Zhang (editors). Proceedings of 10th International Workshop on Security Proofs for Embedded Systems, vol 87, pages 34--48

Links:
BibTeX entry
@inproceedings{PROOFS2021:Multiple_Layer_Candidate_Sieves_Against,
  author    = {Changhai Ou and Fan Zhang and Xinping Zhou and Kexin Qiao and Renjun Zhang},
  title     = {Multiple-Layer Candidate Sieves Against Serial Cryptographic Implementations},
  booktitle = {Proceedings of 10th International Workshop on Security Proofs for Embedded Systems},
  editor    = {Ulrich K\textbackslash{}"uhne and Fan Zhang},
  series    = {EPiC Series in Computing},
  volume    = {87},
  pages     = {34--48},
  year      = {2022},
  publisher = {EasyChair},
  bibsource = {EasyChair, https://easychair.org},
  issn      = {2398-7340},
  url       = {https://easychair.org/publications/paper/wqtL},
  doi       = {10.29007/d3gt}}
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